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of Building Inspection Department of Salt 
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BILL RODERICK, INC., a Utah Corporation. 
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INTERVENOR-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
1 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an action by the appellants (hereinafter 
referred to as plaintiffs). <1 > Said plaintiffs prayed for 
a preliminary injunction restraining and preventing the 
respondents-defendants, Salt Lake County, its officers 
and employees, from issuing any building or other per-
mit which would effect property controlled by an ordi-
nance which became effective on January 11, 1967, 
which amended the zoning of 1.22 acres of property 
located at the southeast corner of 2300 East and 4500 
South, Salt Lake County, Utah, from Residential R-3 
to Commercial C-1. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was decided by the trial court pursuant 
to a hearing on plaintiff's motion for a preliminary 
injunction. The court after hearing testimony and tak-
ing evidence introduced and after submission of memor-
andum by counsel and argument had thereon and the 
court having made and entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, concluded that all the provi-
sions and procedures required by Title 17-27-17, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, and Title 8-1-9 
of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, were 
duly and properly complied' with in the amending of 
( 1) Plaintiffs in their brief allege that this action was on be~~l.f 
of themselves and on behalf of other property owner~ simi· 
larly situated. Intervenor and Resp_ondent would llke. to 
larify that this is no way a cla~s act~on, ~nd ~hat a review 
of the Complaint and the pleadings filed m. this matter, (R. 
1) will indicate this is in no way a class action. 
2 
said zoning ordinance to re-zone said premises from 
Residential R-3 to Commercial C-1, and that the tem-
porary restraining Order then in effect should be va-
cated and the plaintiffs' Complaint dismissed together 
with defendant and intervenor being awarded their 
costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The intervenor-respondent seeks affirmance of the 
trial court judgment based on the record made before 
the trial court and evidence contained therein as sub-
mitted to and heard by the trial court judge. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Bill Roderick, Inc., is the purchaser, of that certain 
tract of real estate located on the southeast corner of 
23rd East and 4500 South, within the Holladay plan-
ning district and is an intervenor-respondent in this 
appeal. On or about the 3rd day of November, 1966, 
the intervenor made application to amend the zoning 
map of Salt Lake County by reclassifying said proper-
ty from Residential R-3 to Commercial C-1. (Def. Ex. 
D-20) This application was submitted to the Holladay 
Planning District for its recommendation. The written 
recommendation was submitted subsequently to the 
Salt Lake County Commission recommending appro-
val, but conditioned that it conform to the Salt Lake 
County master plan. (Pl. Ex. P-1) 
3 
Salt Lake Planning Commission acted upon this 
zoning ordinance and recommended disapproval of the 
application. (Def. Ex. D-23) At the hearing by the 
Planning Commission, two L.D.S. bishops within the 
Holladay Planning District were in attendance and 
made inquiry as to procedures to be followed thereafter. 
(R. 144-146) Said representatives thereupon advised 
the people in the area that the application had been 
denied by the Salt Lake County Planning Commission 
and that approval of said application was unlikely. (R. 
146) Thereupon, the application was forwarded to Salt 
Lake County Commission for its action, including the 
recommendations made by the District Planning Board 
and the Salt Lake County Planning Commission. A 
public hearing on this application was scheduled to be 
held on the 28th day of December, 1966, along with 
various other applications for changes of zoning. Notice 
of said hearing was accomplished by posting a notice of 
a change of zoning hearing on one public utility pole 
near the intersection of 23rd East and 4500 South, in 
front of the subject property. Another notice of the 
proposed zoning change was posted on a utility pole in 
front of the property owned by a Mr. Hendricksen, 
but near the subject property. (Def. Ex. D-56, R. 219· 
220) A third notice of zoning was posted on a bulletin 
board on the west entrance of the City and County 
Building in Salt Lake City. (Def. Ex. D-55). A no· 
tice of said hearing of zoning change applications was 
published along with other applications in the Salt Lake 
Tribune on or about the 26th day of November, 1966. 
(PL Ex. P-7) 
4 
A hearing in due course was held on the applica-
tion and information was submitted to the commission 
presenting facts justifying the change of zoning. Ad-
ditional facts were submitted by other people in attend-
ance at said hearing. (Def. Ex. D-35) 
Said change of zoning was adopted unanimously 
after taking the matter under advisement. (Def. Ex. 
D-37) Thereupon, the new ordinance was submitted 
to the county commission pursuant to its action for sig-
nature. (Def. Ex. D-39) Prior to the signature, some-
time after the enactment of the ordinance, plaintiffs 
and appellants petitioned the county commission to 
rescind its action, (PL Ex. P-48), and a meeting with-
out notice to applicant was held and the ordinance sub-
sequently signed. This action to invalidate said ordi-
nance resulted thereby. 
INTERVENOR-RESPONDENT'S POSITION 
The trial court's decision should be affirmed for 
the following reasons: 
I. That all provisions and procedures required by 
Title 17-27-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended and Title 8-1-9 of the "Revised Ordinances , 
of Salt Lake County" were duly and properly com-
plied with in the amending of said zoning ordinance 
to re-zone said premises from Residential R-3 to Com-
mercial C-1. 
2. That the amended zoning ordinance is valid. 
5 
3. That the county commissioners did not act in 
an arbitrary, and capricious manner and that they pro-
perly refused to rehear said matter pursuant to the peti-
tion of the appellants. That further, appellants' petition 
for re-hearing was not based on any statutory proce-
dures or by any authority of law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SALT LAKE COUNTY PURSUANT TO 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY HAS THE POW-
ER TO AMEND ZONING ORDINANCES. 
The legislature has delegated the power to zone 
to Salt Lake County so that the need for a protective 
plan might be met and has provided means for the pro· 
tection of private property through notice and public 
hearings. U.C.A. (1953), 17-27-1. 
In pursuing its authority to zone a county, a 
county commission shall perform a legislative function 
and has wide discretion. The action of the zoning au-
thority is endowed with a strong presumption of validi-
ty and the courts will not interfere with a commission's 
action unless it clearly appears to be beyond its powers 
or is unconstitutional. Gayland vs. Salt Lake County, 
11 U. 2d 307, 358 P. 2d 633. 
A presumption of validity and reasonableness at-
tends zoning ordinances and amendments thereto. In 
6 
8 McQuillin, l\!Iunicipal Corporations, 3d Ed. 559, Sec. 
25.295, it is further said: 
"The presumption of the reasonableness vali-
dity and constitutionality of ordinances a~plies 
fully to zoning ordinances and amendments of 
zoning ordinances. Every intendment in favor 
of their validity is to be indulged. This is partic-
ularly true since zoning is governmental and leg-
islative in character, and constitutes an exercise 
of the police power to promote the publtc welfare. 
It is presumed that the zoning power has been 
exercised reasonably by the zoning ordinance and 
that the ordinance is for purposes and within the 
scope of the police power. That is to say, it is 
presumed that such an ordinance is designed to 
promote the public welfare. The court will pre-
sume that in enacting a zoning ordinance the 
(city council) acted with full knowledge of rele-
vant conditions and circumstances ... " 
POINT II 
SALT LAKE COUNTY GAVE ADE -
QUATE NOTICE OF THE HEARING TO BE 
HELD DECEMBER 28, 1966, AS REQUIRED 
BY LAW. 
Section 17-27-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, provides: 
"Before finally adopting any such amend-
ment, the board of county commissioners s?all 
hold a public hear~ng thereon, at leas~ thirty 
days' notice of the time and pl.ace. of ':"Inch shall 
be given by at least one publication m a news-
7 
pap~r of.general circu~ation in the county and by 
pos~mg m th~ee public places designed to give 
notice thereof to the persons effected." (Em-
phasis added) 
Provisions in statutes requiring notice preparatory 
to the enactment or amendment of zoning measures 
typically provide for constructive rather than actual 
notice as the publication in a local newspaper for a 
specified number of times. Ordinances based pursuant 
to them have been attacked as invalid in that without 
actual notice the owner has been deprived of his proper-
ty without due process of law. The courts have rather 
uniformly held that this contention is groundless and 
that the statute need not provide for nor the ordinances 
be passed upon actual notice. See Wanamaker vs. City 
Council of El Monte (1962) 200 Cal. App. 2d 453, 19 
Cal. Rptr. 554. <2 > 
Where the notice of a proposed rezoning hearing 
is given, by a publication in a newspaper in accordance 
with the State Statute, the fact that a property owner 
effected by he rezoning did not read the particular news-
paper in which the notice was published, does not in-
validate the notice. Braden vs. Much (1949) 403 Ill. 
507, 87 N.E. 2d 620. (Emphasis added) 
The adequacy of particular newspaper publica-
tions of the notice required by various zoning statutes 
) In this case the court reviewed the property owner's conten· 
<2 tion that the city council could not proper:ly ado~t a ~e~ 
zoning ordinance without personally se:i:-vmg n?tlce o f 
hearing on the proposed ordinance or mak~ng service the~e~e 
by mail. The property own~r . was an air operator w ? g 
activities would be impermissible under the new zorun 
ordinance. 
8 
have been questioned in a number of instances. In ab-
sence of the particular stiatutory requ;irements, the 
publications need not be given any special notoriety by 
reason either of the size of print, location in newspapers 
or number of publications. A single publication of no-
tice prior to a hearing to amend a zoning ordinance was 
held sufficient compliance with the statutory provisions 
requiring at least fifteen days' notice in Central Realty 
Corp. vs. Allison ( 1951) 218 SC 435, 63 S.E. 2d 153. 
"The tests which will generally determine the 
questions of whether the notices were posted in 
public places within the meaning of the statute is 
whether the posting of the notices in the particu-
lar places fulfilled the purpose giving the pub-
licity contemplated by the nature of the notice 
required." Wann vs. Re-organized School Dist. 
No. 6 of St. Francois County, 293 S. W. 2d 408, 
413. 
The United States Supreme Court in Mullane vs. 
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 206 
70 S. Ct. 652. ( 1950) acknowledged that the require-
ment of due process in any proceeding which is to be 
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under 
all the circumstances, to appraise interested parties and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections. 
Section 17-27-17, of the Utah Code provides that 
notice be given by posting in three public places de-
signed to give notice thereof to the persons eff cted. 
The following discussion illustrates that the Salt Lake 
County Commission did observe the statutory mandate 
and its notice requirements. 
9 
(a) The County Did Use Adequate Modes or 
Manner of Giving Notice in Public Places as Required 
by Law. 
Salt Lake County pursuant to the above mentioned 
statute posted notice in the Salt Lake Tribune on 
or about November 26, 1966. Notices were also pub-
lished in three public places located in Salt Lake 
County. Mr. Preston E. Evans, employed by the De-
partment of Zoning Administration of Salt Lake 
County, testified, and in his testimony identified (Def. 
Ex. D-55) , which was a notice of a zoning hearing and 
testified that he posted a notice of hearing on the south 
bulletin board of the west entrance of the City and 
County Building on November 23, 1966. (R. 214-215) 
Mr. Clair J. Hardman, also employed by the De-
partment of Zoning Administration of Salt Lake 
County, testified that he posted two notices of a zoning 
hearing in this matter on two utility poles which were 
located in Holladay, Utah. <3 > Mr. Hardman was 
shown and he identified (Def. Ex. D-56) which indi-
cated the location of two of the notices that were posted 
for the public hearing in this matter. (R. 219-220) <4> 
(3) One of the utility poles is located about ten to eighteen feet 
from the intersection at 4500 South 2300 East, Holladay, Utah 
on the east side of the road adjacent to the property in que~· 
tion (R. 219-220). The other utility pole is located approx1· 
mately 190 feet south of the farther north po~e and is located 
adjacent to the property of Mr. H. R. Hendricksen; and that 
the pole adjacent to Mr. Hendricksen's property is about 85 
feet south from the corner of his property. (R. 136, 220) 
(4) Also see the testimony of Mr. Marvin W. Walbin (pla!nt!ffffs: 
witness) found on page 174 of the Record and plamb s 
Exhibit number 54. 
10 
In Graham vs. Fitz (1876) 53 Mis~. 307, the court 
was concerned with the notice requirements pursuant 
to a sale of property pursuant to a trustee's sale. The 
court said on page 314: 
"It was not the duty of the Trustee to make 
daily and hourly observations of the three public 
places of the notices, so as to insure their remain-
ing posted. It is not true that the displacement 
of the posted notices by casualty or design would 
invalidate a sale under them after they had been 
duly posted. . . . The trustee under this deed of 
trust, may lawfully sell on the day designated 
without regard to the fact of wind or rain or some 
mischievous or evil dispossessed person may have 
removed one or all of the notices. Any other rule 
would invalidate such sales. It would place in 
the power of the mischievous or evilminded per-
sons to defeat every proposed sale under such 
deeds of trust. Any such rule is impractical, 
impolitic, and titles would be so insecure under 
it as to forbid competition at such sales and lead 
to the sacrifice of property." 
( 1) Postings Were Made at Public Places as Re-
quired by Law. 
The courts have held that the posting of notices 
upon utility poles or fence posts located at the inter-
section of roads or on road boundaries as being suffi-
cient and that these notices are as likely to be seen as 
at any other place in the territory. The postings by 
Salt Lake County were at three public places as re-
quired by law. State em rel. Grant School Dist. vs. 
School Board of Jefferson Joint School Dist. (1958) 
4 Wis. 2d 499, 91 N.W. 2d 219. 
11 
"Pub~ic plac~s as applied to the requirements 
of postmg notices at public places are those 
places, that af!ord the most publicity without 
regm:a to the title owner of the property." (Em-
phasis added) See Whittingham vs. Hopkins 
54 A. 250, 69 N.J.L. 189. ' 
Where a tree, post or similar object used for post-
ing a notice is in a place exposed to traffic and the pub-
lic view, posting thereon has been approved as com-
pliance with public "place requirements." 90 A.L.R. 
2d 1224. 
Courts have also rejected the contention that be-
cause the telephone poles were private proprty and sub-
ject to removal by the owner at any time they could not 
constitute public places. The court held that if a notice 
is posted in a public place where the attention of the 
public is likely to be attracted, the purpose of the law 
is satisfied regardless of who may own the property on 
which the notice is displayed. <5 > Mahon vs. Buechel 
Sewer Constr. Dist. No. 1 (1962, Ky.) 355 S.W. 2d 
683. (Emphasis added) 
Government buildings, such as courthouses, town 
halls, and post offices have frequently been held suffi. 
ciently public that a notice prominently posted on or 
(5) It would seem by this writer's opinion, that the place~ that 
would gain the most notoriety and would affor~ notice to 
those persons interested in the zoning proceedings them: 
selves would be in the vicinity of the property to be effected, 
and as cited supra, two of the pub~i<: I?laces namely the t~o 
utility poles were located in the v1cm1ty of the property I~ 
question. See also Schroeder vs. New York, 371 U.S. 20 
(1962), 83 S. Ct. 279. 
12 
in such a building, satisfies the statutory requiremt:ri..~. 
(~mphasis added) See 90 A.L.R. 2d 1218. 
( 2) l?' os tmgs Were .l.Hade at Three Public 1' laces. 
'fhe county posted three notices at three pubnc 
piaces, to-wit: The south bulletin board on the wesc 
entrance of the City and County Courthouse buil<lmg, 
the utility pole located at the intersection of 23rd ~ast 
aml 4500 South adjacent to the property in question awl 
ihe utility pole approximately 210 feet south of tlle 
mtersection at 4500 South and 23rd East adjacent to 
the property owned by Mr. H. R. Hendricksen. 
In Graham vs. Fitz (1876) 53 :Miss. 307, the court 
held that the requirement of notices to be posted in 
three public places was also complied with where one of 
the notices was posted on the inside of the post office 
door which was closed every Sunday after 10 :00 a.m. 
and another notice was posted on the Courthouse door 
in the same town. The Courthouse and the post office 
being within 150 yards of each other. The court stated, 
"that if 150 yards is to be shown a distance to separate 
two public places, what space shall be adopted as great 
enough. The law has no rule on the subject." 
Also in McFarlane et al. vs. Witney (1940) 134 
S.,V. 2d 1047, the court upheld posting on a Court-
house and on a service station which was 400 feet from 
the Courthouse; and the court stated in this case that 
the property where the notices were posted were in no 
way connected through ownership. 
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The plaintiffs in the above entitled matter are 
questioning whether or not the notices posted by Sali 
Lake County provided plaintiffs with proper notice of 
the zoning proceedings. It seems minute to questiod 
lhe distance involved between the posting of the notices. 
In this writers' opinion what could afford more notorie-
ty than notices posted on or near the vicinity of the 
property in question. The Supreme Court of Utah has 
stated in the case of In Re. Phillips, Estate 86 U. 358, 
44 P. 2d 699, 703 (1935). 
"An affirmative rule of what is sufficient de-
pends so much upon the situation in every county, 
and perhaps the situation of the cases themselves, 
that hard and fast rules cannot be enunciated." 
Caldwell vs. Moffat (1919) 215 Ill. App. 583, held 
that although the statute provided for posting of notices 
in three of the most public places in town or district in 
the vicinity of the road to be widened, altered, vacated 
or laid out; even if the posting was not in strictly one 
of the most public places in town, the failure to conform 
to a strict construction of the law in respect to this one 
particular notice was but a mere irregularity and did 
not destroy the jurisdiction of the highway commis· 
sioners. <6 > (Emphasis added) 
( 3) The Places of Posting were Designed to Give 
Notice Thereof to the Persons Affected as Required 
by Law. 
(6) The Notice requirement pursuant to the Utah C?de Annotat~~ 
(1953) 17-27-17, does not contain the language m.three oft 
most public places, but states only in three public places. 
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The persons or person charged with posting no-
tices in public places must necessarily exercise and are 
entitled to exercise at their discretion in the selection of 
locations of the posts where these postings are in public 
places and further, no one may complain that in his 
judgment the notices should have been placed in other 
public places. <7 > And it is not important that a notice 
cannot be read by travelers while riding down the high-
way in their automobiles and that no such requirement 
is contemplated by the statute itself. It is further not 
necessarily determinative of the question on the posting 
that all of the notices can be read by one standing on the 
highway or road. Wann vs. Re-organized School Dist. 
(1956, Mo.) 293, S.W. 2d 408. (Emphasis added) 
(b) The Legal Description Used by the County 
in the Notice of the Zoning Hearing was Adequate. 
The boundaries of the legal description of the 
property in question must only be described with rea-
sonable certainty and with a definiteness sufficient for 
identification. (Speroni vs. Board of Appeals of City 
of Sterling, 368 Ill. 568, 15 N.E. 2d 302.) Zoning ordi-
(7) Again this writer would like to stress that the places that 
would gain the most notoriety and ~ould affor9- notice to 
those persons interested in the zomng proceedmgs them-
selves would be in the vicinity of the property to be effected; 
and as cited supra, two of the pub~ic; I?laces namely the t"'.o 
utility poles were located in the vicmity of the property m 
question. See also Schroeder vs. New York, 371 U.S. 208 
(1962), 83 S. Ct. 279. The courth<?use wh~ch was .select.ed as 
the third public place seems a logical choice and is d~signed 
to give notice thereof to the persons effected as reqmred by 
law. Within the courthouse building an individual will find 
the recorded's office, the courts themselves, the .S~lt Li;ike 
County treasurer and assessor's offic~ and. the she~iff.s _offic~. 
All of these places would bear a relationship to an mdividual s 
property. 
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nances have been upheld, even though there have been 
minor inadequacies in the description of the boundaries. 
39 A.L.R. 2d P. 766. 
Section 17-27-17, Utah Code Annotated, provides: 
"That 30 days' notice of the time and place of which 
shall be given by at least one publication in a newspaper 
of general circulation in the county ... " That on or 
about November 26, 1966, Salt Lake County caused 
to have published in the Salt Lake Tribune notice of 
the zoning hearing of the subject property. Plaintiffs 
in this action have made argument in their brief that 
the description in the notice published by Salt Lake 
County was inadequate. Zoning ordinances have been 
upheld in several cases, even though there have been 
minor inadequacies in the description of the boundaries. 
(See Ciaffone, et al. vs. Community Shopping Corpora-
tion, et al. 77 S.E. 2d 817. Speroni vs. Board of Ap-
pecils of City of Sterling. (1938) 368 Ill. 568, 15 N.E. 
2d 302. The courts in these cases illustrated in their 
reasoning that the requirement in the legal descriptions 
pursuant to public notice is a test of whether or not 
the description is reasonably certain and with a definite-
ness sufficient for identification. 
Mr. Ralph Y. McClure, the zoning administrator 
for Salt Lake County, and having been employed by 
Salt Lake County about fifteen years testified that it 
was possible to locate the property pursuant to the de-
scription used by the County, and he further testified 
that the property was described as reasonbly as the de· 
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scription used on tax notices. In fact, he was asked the 
following question: "Does it describe the property as 
reasonable as the actual tax description?" Answer: 
"Well, it is my opinion it's easier to decipher our de-
scription than the tax notice's." (R. 208, 209) 
He further testified that the descriptions are not 
the same a.s the tax notice descriptions for the fact that 
most of the legal descriptions the county receives are 
several descriptions and that the Salt Lake County Zon-
ing Administration combines the descriptions into one 
and describes just the subject property. (R. 209) 
The court~ have held on many occasions that the 
subject property need not be described perfectly, so long 
as the recipients of the notice can reasonably ascertain 
from the description that the property in which they 
are interested may be effected by the enactment. In 
one case, an ordinance was held valid despite the fact 
that the description of property effected by it was clif-
f erent from the property described in the notice pur-
suant to which it was passed. See Bregar vs. Britton 
(1954, Fla.) 75 So. 2d 753, cert. den. 348 U.S. 972, 99 
L. ed. 757, 75 S. Ct. 534. (By implication) The court 
in this case pointed out that it appeared that the pro-
perty effected by the ordinance was included in the 
property described in the Notice. 
The plaintiffs, in their brief at page 20, make men-
tion of the effectiveness of newspaper publications and 
cite a comment by Justice Black in the case of Walker 
vs. Hutchinson 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956). That case 
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dealt with a condemnation of an individual's own pro-
perty in a proceeding instituted by a City against a 
land owner and that notice of the proceeding to deter-
mine the land owner's compensation was given only by 
publication in the official City newspaper as authorized 
by statutes then in force. The facts in the Walker Case 
are far different than the situation in this matter and 
the comments by Justice Black would in no way be valid 
law as to the fact situation in the present case. It can 
well be understood why in a condemnation proceeding 
against a land owner he was denied due process of law 
by publication only in a newspaper. The plaintiffs and 
appellants in this action in no way have a proprietary 
or possessory interest in the subject property in the 
above entitled matter located on the southeast corner 
of 2300 East and 4500 South, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and they would not be subject to the same 
rules and principles of law as commented on by Justice 
Black in the Walker case, as cited supra. 
( c) The County Caused Writings and Posted 
Notices to be Exposed to View of the Public for the 
Required Period of Time. 
It is well established that notice was published in 
the Salt Lake Tribune on or about November 26, 1966. 
It has further been established that Mr. Evans posted 
one notice at the south bulletin board on the west en-
trance of the city and county building. (R. 215) It is 
further established and uncontradicted, that Mr. Hard· 
man posted two notices on utility poles located at two 
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public places in Salt Lake County, Holladay, Utah. 
( R. 218-219) 
Plaintiffs' own witness, Mr. Marvin W. Wallen, 
identified plaintiff's Exhibit Number 54 and testified 
as to remnants of red markings peculiar to zoning no-
tices posted on the above mentioned utility poles. ( R. 
17 4-17 5) Further Bill Roderick, Inc., intervenor, pro-
duced a witness, Mr. Dennis Leon Ekins, who was an 
uninterested party in this action, (R. 107) who stated 
that he traveled along 23rd East and 4500 South, Hol-
laday, Utah, daily during the period of November, 1966 
through Christmas, 1966. (R. 105) He further testi-
fied that just before Christmas, 1966, that he and a 
friend were traveling along 23rd East just south of 
4500 South, the vicinity of the subject property, and 
that his friend brought his attention to a notice of zon-
ing change. (R. 105) He was asked the following 
question by Mr. Everett E. Dahl: "You were able to 
see the zoning signs from your automobile?" Answer: 
"Uh huh" (affirmative R. 106). He further stated, 
"We could see them real good." (Emphasis added R. 
106) 
He was shown plaintiff's Exhibit Number 2, (the 
type of zoning notice used by Salt Lake County and 
containing the red markings) and he stated that he 
remembered the red letters on the notice that he had 
seen. (R. 106) Mr. Ekins was further asked by the 
court if he looked at the pole and the witness testified 
that he did look at the pole. (R. no) Mr. Ekins fur-
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d1er testified that on another occasion he had an oppor-
tumty to look at the notices of zoning changes a Iew 
year_s ago in Ogden. ( R. 112) 
rrnlllt1H produced several witnesses all of witoiu 
testu1ed tnat they had not seen tne notices tnaL wert 
posteu oy ::,ale Lake County rn the viciruty of tile suu-
Ject property. ;:jome of these witnesses also testmeu 
tnat tlley did not l)ee the notice in the newspaper e1t11er. 
H would appear that plaintiff's method of showmg tilat 
tt1e notices were not posted through negative testllllony 
of witnesses is weightless as against positive witnesses 
oi the defendant and intervenor and does not prove lliar 
the notices were not posted on the poles any more thau 
the notice was not published in the newspaper. 
Plaintiffs raise the argument that Salt Lake 
County in no way introduced any evidence as to the 
policing of these notices by the County during this 30 
day period prior to the hearing itself. It appears as a 
matter of fact that three notices were posted in public 
places at least 30 days prior to the hearing and that a 
notice was published in the Salt Lake Tribune prior to 
this time also. Mr. Ekins, as mentioned above, testified 
as to the time when he saw the notices that were posted 
on the utility poles indicating that the notices had been 
in the Holladay area near the subject property for the 
prescribed period of time. A reading of Section 17-27· 
17, Utah Code Annotated, in no way sets forth the re· 
quirement of policing the notices posted by Salt Lake 
County. This would raise an interesting problem in that 
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a property owner in the area that was adverse to fo-.: 
iomng change could tear down the posted notices and 
tneretore defeat the posting period by his act. .lius 
mterpretation would seem to be unreasonable and un-
practical. It appears that a reasonable and valid con-
r 
struction of the statute would be one that the statute 
requires notice of at least 30 days in advance prior to 
the hearing. This requirement it would appear contem-
plated a period of 30 days for interested parties and 
parties to be effected by the zoning ordinances or zoning 
amendment to be placed on notice of such hearing at 
least 30 days in advance to allow them enough time for 
their preparation to appear at the hearing and to be 
heard. This interpretation seems reasonable in that the 
statute only requires one notice to be published in the 
newspaper and does not require the publishing of no-
tices in the newspaper for each day during a thirty day 
period prior to the hearing. It has heretofore been 
argued that policing of these notices is not a require-
ment of law. This writer will not labor this point and 
again cites its authority, Graham vs. Fitz (1876) 53 
Miss. 307. 
POINT III 
THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY SALT LAKE 
COUNTY IN THIS CASE MEET THE STATU-
TORY REQUIREMENT AND THE PROCE-
DURE AND ACTION PURSUANT THERE-
TO AND AFFORDS EFFECTED PROPERTY 
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0 W N E R S T HE IR CONSTITUTIONAL 
lt1GH'1' TU DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The writer is aware that the United States .Su-
preme Court has decided questions on this pomt as to 
the due process of law issue. One of these decisions, 
Mullane vs. Central Hanover National Bank, 339 U.::i. 
300 (1950) which was also cited in plaintiff's brief, seis 
forth the requirement of due process of law as bemg 
one that affords to persons effected, notice reasonably 
calculated under all the circumstances to appraise those 
parties of the pending action and afford them an oppor-
tunity to present their objections. This case involved 
notice by publication to the beneficiaries of a common 
trust fund and the court did consider the problem of 
sufficiency of notice under the due process clause. It 
should be pointed out that in this case they overruled 
petitioner's objections to the violation of denial of due 
process as to the published notice to those persons who 
were unknown to the trustee. However, the court in 
the Mullane case, as cited supra, states at page 59, "We 
recognize the practical difficulties and costs that would 
be attendant on frequent investigations of the status of 
great numbers of 'beneficiaries' many of whose interest 
in the common fund are so remote as to be ephemeral; 
and we have no doubt that such impractical and ex-
tended services are not required in the name of due 
process." (Emphasis added) . The court, in this case, 
further acknowledged that the Supreme Court of the 
United States had not hesitated to approve the resort-
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ing to publication as a cu_stomary substitute in another 
class of cases where it is not reasonably possible or prac-
tical to give more adequate warnings, i.e., where people 
are missing or wnknown. (Emphasis added) The re-
quirement of notice of a public hearing preparatory to 
the enactment of zoning measures has typically pro-
vided a constructive rather than actual notice, i.e., pub-
lication in a newspaper. These statutes and ordinances 
passed pursuant to them have on several occasions been 
attacked as invalid and that without actual notice, the 
owner has been deprived of hi.s property without due 
process of law. (Emphasis added) The courts have 
uniformly held that this contention is without merit and 
that the statute need not provide, nor the ordinance be 
passed upon, actual rwtice. <s> Plaintiffs' brief cites 
Schroeder vs. New York, 371 U.S. 208 {1962), 83 S. 
Ct. 279. This again is a condemnation proceeding and 
it is acknowledged by intervenor that some twenty-two 
notices were posted on trees and poles in the general 
vicinity of plaintiffs' property. However, the court in 
that case was not impressed by the many places that 
notices were posted, but stated at Page 282, "No such 
sign was placed anywhere on the appellant's property." 
The point to be made of this case is that this was a con-
demnation of an individual's own property and not a 
case of general notice to many unknown individuals. 
It should be further mentioned that the general 
rule is that personal notice to property owners effected 
(8) See 96 A. L. R. 2d P. 459. Several jurisdictions and court 
cases are cited therein. 
23 
by a zoning regulation or amendment is not a prerequi. 
site t~ the valid e~actment t~ereof; however, the zoning 
enablmg statute itself sometimes requires public notice 
for a specified length of time and the holding of a public 
hearing by the zoning commission. 58 Am. J ur. P. 944, 
Sec. 10. Zoning. 
In summary the essence of the issue of whether or 
not the requirement of due process of law has been 
met is not the criterion of the possibility of conceiv· 
able injury, but the reasonable character of the re· 
quirements having reference to the subject which 
the statute pertains. Mullane vs. Central Hanover 
National Bank, 339 U.S. 306 ( 1950). As noted 
above in this brief, we are concerned here with an exer· 
cise of a legislative power delegated to the Salt Lake 
County Commission and it should be noted that there 
is a fundamental distinction, as regards due process of 
law, between a legislative hearing and an adversary 
proceeding. It is not necessary under the requirement 
of due process of law that interested parties be present 
at all stages of the legislative deliberations. This re· 
quirement is properly applicable only in adversary pro· 
ceedings. See Hart vs. Bayless Investment and Tral 
ing Company (1959) 346 P. 2d 1101. A point that 
should be remembered in this case is that the plaintiffi 
in this action are residents of the Holladay area, a few 
of them are neighbors or living adjacent to the subject 
property in this action. None of the plaintiffs have a 
direct or proprietary legal interest in the subject pro· 
perty. Their only complaint is that of being affect~ 
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as residents of the area and subjected in this manner to 
a zoning change of the subject property. The court in 
Benner vs. 1lribbitt, 190 Md. 6, 57 A2d 346 353 stated 
' ' ' "~xercise of the police power in zoning regulations 
cannot be governed by a plebiscite of neighbors or for 
their benefit." 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS DID OBSERVE STATU-
T 0 RY AND PROCEDURAL REQUIRB-
MENTS. 
Plaintiffs in their brief under point IV, make 
lengthy argument as to whether or not certain proce-
dures were followed by defendant and whether or not 
Bill Roderick, Inc., was a proper applicant. This issue 
is improperly before the court on appeal and should be 
summarily dismissed on the basis that nowhere in plain-
tiffs' complaint, (R. 1), is this issue raised and further 
nowhere in the Trial Record was this issue heard or 
1\ determined by the lower court; however, it should be 
~· pointed out that Mr. William C. Roderick, President 
J- of Bill Roderick, Inc., did appear before the court on 
J. the 4th day of May, 1967, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. and 
at in his testimony (R. 250), he testified that he began 
fi negotiating and had made payment during the month 
:w of August, 1966, pursuant to the purchase of the pro-
ct perty in question located at 2300 East 4500 South, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah; and that the actual clos-
·o· ing was consummated on November 23, 1966, when at 
ea that time a Uniform Real Estate Contract was entered 
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into by respondent and intervenor. He further testified 
that he had also entered into an Earnest Money Agree-
ment prior to the execution of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (IL 251). It should be clearly pointed out 
that this hearing on the 4th day of May was for the 
purpose of determining a bond that would be required 
to be posted by the plaintiffs in order to restrain the 
defendants from further action in this matter while 
the above entitled action was on appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Utah. The low~r court did issue an order and 
finding that the plaintiff would be required to file with 
the clerk of the court a security in the amount of 
$6,500.00, for payment of such costs and damages as 
may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found 
to have been wrongfully restrained. This was signed 
by the lower court on the 18th day of May, 1967. (R. 
38, 39) It should further be pointed out that the Order 
Vacating the Temporary Injunction and the Dismissal 
of plaintiffs' Complaint was signed on the 17th day of 
April, 1967, (R. 31) and the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were also entered by the court on 
said date. (R. 33, 34, 35, 36, and 37) Nowhere in said 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law appears tl1e 
issue as argued by the plaintiffs in this matter. 
Plaintiff further complains that the ordinance is 
invalid on the basis that certain office procedures within 
the planning commission were not followed in that .the 
list of the property owners within 150 feet of the sub.Jee! 
property were not furnished and that no statements 
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were furnished from the property owners in the vicinity 
expressing their position on the propo_sed change oi 
zomng. Nowhere in the State Statutes, nor in the 
County Ordinances themselves, is any such requirement 
set forth and the procedures complained of is mere 
information that the planning staff likes to have in 
arriving at their recommendations. Failure to comply 
with these requirements is not jurisdictional nor man-
datory in the zoning procedures, and are mere irregu-
larities and fly specks which frequently occur in 
legislative positions. Caldwell vs. Moffatt, 215 Ill. App. 
583, (1919). 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT COMMISSIONERS' AC -
TIONS WERE REASONABLE AND SAID 
ACTIONS WERE NOT ARBITRARY OR CA-
PRICIOUS. 
It should be pointed out that in pursuing its au-
thority to zone a county, a county commission shall 
perform a legislative function and has wide diescretion. 
The action of the zoning authority is endowed with a 
strong presumption of validity and the courts will not 
interfere with a commission's action unless it clearly 
appears to be beyond its powers or is constitutional. 
Gayland vs. Salt Lake Comity, 11 U. 2d 307, 358 P. 2d 
633. Also a presumption of validity and reasonableness 
attends zoning ordinances and amendments thereto. 8 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d Ed. 559, Sec. 
25.295. 
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Even though it may be true that there was informa. 
tion presented to the commission for denial of the 
amending of the zoning ordinances or as advocated by 
the plaintiffs in this matter, it is also true that informa-
tion was presented by Bill Roderick, Inc., the inter-
venor and respondent, in favor of the change of zoning. 
The evidence in the possession of the planning commis-
sion and before the county commission, was not intro-
duced into evidence and the matter of reasonableness 
of the determination by the County Commissioners was 
not an issue during the trial. ( R. 213) It is not the 
prerogative of the court to substitute its judgment for 
that of the county commission. Parkinson vs. Watson, 
4 Utah 2d 191, 291P.2d400, and Gayland vs. Salt Lake 
County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633. 
(a) In Refusing to Permit Certain Proper~' 
Owners a Rehearing on the Zoning Ordinance Which 
Had Been Enacted In This Matter, the Defendant 
Commissioners Acted in a Reasonable Manner and Did 
Not Act Arbitrarily or Capriciously. 
This court has previously held that it would not 
intervene in the wisdom of the subject legislative action. 
Gaylen vs. Salt Lake County, supra. It should be fur· 
ther pointed out again that there was not sufficie~t 
evidence to even raise the issue of arbitrary and capr1• 
· · · h 1 rt ciousness of the county comm1ss10n m t e ower cou · 
( R. 213) The plaintiffs did raise an issue of arbitrary 
and capricious action in the commission's failure to re· 
scind its action taken on January 11, 1967, (Def. Ex. 
D-39) pursuant to a petition presented to the defend· 
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ant commissioners on January IO, 1967, (Pl. Ex. P-48), 
which was nothing more than an abortive and ex-party 
proceeding instituted by the plaintiffs. The procedure 
taken is not provided for by statute and again only 
goes to the merits of the wisdom of the legislative action 
taken by the commission. The mere fact that many 
names were procured on a petion objecting to the action 
of the commission is no evidence of the wisdom of the 
legislative action taken. It effects only legislative ex-
pediency which may be considered by the commission. 
Plaintiffs further contend that the planning com-
mission acted in recommending a denial of the zoning 
change prior to its receipt from the Holladay District 
Planning Commission. It should be noted that the 
recommendations of the Holladay Planning Commis-
sion were merely advisory and its recommendation did 
not have any particular bearing upon the planning com-
mission's action because the planning commission rec-
ommended denial of the zoning change whereas the 
Holladay District Planning Commission had recom-
mended favorable action. Both the report of the Holla-
day District Planning Commission and the report of 
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission were sub-
mitted to the Salt Lake County Commission, who 
eventually made the final decision concerning the 
zoning. 
There is very little evidence in the record concern-
ing the facts dealing with the property in question, and 
the facts either justifying the zoning or not justifying 
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the zoning of the subject property, except that plaintif!i 
and persons signing the petition were opposed to it. h 
order for a court of law to substitute its judgment for 
the county commission, the evidence must be clear and 
convincing that the commission acted arbitrarily an<l 
capriciously. The plaintiffs conceded during the trial 
on a direct query from the trial judge that there was 
no issue to arbitrarines.s and capriciousness as to the 
action taken by the county commission. Plaintiffs' only 
claim to arbitrariness and capriciousness was their 
assertion that the county commission did not reconsider 
and call an additional public hearing on the matter. 
The petition was filed with the county commission set-
ting forth plaintiffs' objections to the zoning prior to 
the final action by the county commission in enacting 
the recommendations of the planning commission, 
which already were before the commission. (R. 213) 
(b) The Re-Zoning of the Subject Property was 
Reasonable and Constitutional. 
The subject property is located at the intersection 
of 2300 East and 4500 South, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and is bounded on three sides by public streeh. 
On page 42 of the Master Plan for Salt Lake County. 
(Def. Ex. D-42), is the provision for the interstate sys· 
tern and access roads in the Big Cottonwood District 
and specifies that: 
"Circulation within the District will be pro-
vided in the future by the planned system .o! 
expressways and major arterials which will ID· 
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elude: 700 East Street; the Cottonwood Ex-
pressway; 2300 Ewst Street; and 4500 South 
Stre~t; all to be improved to provide adequate 
traffic capacity." (.1£imphasis added) 
1.l.h1s property, as indicated by the Salt Lake County 
.t'lannmg Staff itself, acknowledges that the existmg 
tl-8 zomng was not the proper zoning for this property 
but had questions as to the wisdom of whether additionai 
commercial sites were neces_sary. (Def. Ex. D-25) 
This property for years had remained vacant and as 
pointed out by Mary .Metcalf at the public hearing on 
December 28, 1966, (Def. Ex. D-34), wherein she 
stated that she knew the area well and that the young 
teenage element used the property for a lover's nest, 
and that the young people shoot at pheasants and quail 
on the property and that she would like to _see the pro-
perty developed and the vacant property lighted up. 
Mary Metcalf is a resident residing at 4567 South 2300 
East. Other evidence was also before the commission 
showing the planned development of the area and the 
advantages of said zoning. The evidence concerning 
the facts surrounding the zoning is not included in the 
record on appeal for the simple reason that there is no 
genuine issue as to whether or not the zoning was rea-
sonable or proper. As to the Master Plan, it was en-
visioned that zoning changes within the county would 
within necessity have to be made. Zoning must be alive, 
viable and must meet changing conditions, highway 
traffic and channalization of traffic to freeway and 
expressway entrances and exits. Certain established 
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commercial areas may die on the vine because of cliang 
mg conditions of population or traffic and other ne
11 
areas need to be established to ~atisfy the changin~ 
situations. All of this action is the prerogative 01 th, 
elected political officials charged with this respom1• 
bility, to-wit: the county commissioners. The Supreme 
Court has consistently ruled that the courts will not su~ 
stitute its judgment for the governmental bodies 
charged with the enactment of constitutional legisla. 
lation. This writer feels quite sure that the plaintiffs 
do not wish to challenge per se the constitutionality of 
the right of the county commission to act in the area o[ 
zoning property. If zoning is an unconstitutional func· 
tion of the county, none of the zoning ordinances are 
valid and this would defeat plaintiff's purpose. 
( c) The Re-Zoning of the Subject Property b 
Grounded Upon Reason and Based On the Policy of 
the Statute. 
Plaintiffs contend under this section of their briei 
that the zoning change constituted spot zoning, and tl1a! 
commissioner Blomquist was prohibited by law from 
signing the zoning ordinance. As frequently mentioneo 
in other parts of intervenor's brief, there are not suffi. 
cient facts in this record on appeal for the courts to 
attempt to substitute its judgment for the county c~JD· 
mission. The burden of proof rests on those challengm~ 
the validity of the ordinance and as stated in 8 M cQ11u· 
Zin, Municipal Corporations, 3d Ed. 559, Sec. 25.29~ 
page 562: 
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"T~e rule that the burden of proof is on one 
asser~mg. the ~nreasonableness, invalidity or un-
c~nshtutionahty of an ordinance is applicable 
with respect to zoning ordinances and amend-
ments ~hereto. Leastwise, where a zoning ordi-
nance is not invalid on its face the burden of 
alleging and proving facts to su'pport the claim 
of its. invalidity is on the pa:i;ty asserting it. *** 
Consistently, there is no burden on a municipal 
corporation to show facts establishing the validity 
of zoning." 
"The burden of proof on one asserting the 
invalidity of a zoning ordinance extends to the 
issue of whether or not the ordinance will pro-
mote the public safety, health, morals, order, 
welfare, prosperity or convenience, and it ex-
tends to the issue whether or not the classification 
made by the ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary 
or discriminatory.***" 
The trial of this case was conducted primarily on 
the issue of the notice given by the Salt Lake County 
Commission for a public hearing on December 28, 1966. 
The problem of spot zoning was given very little atten-
tion and primarily nothing more than lip service. It 
should be pointed out that the district re-zoned is rela-
tively a large tract, exceeding one acre, completely sur-
rounded by three public highways, two of which are 
heavily traveled streets and projected to become major 
arterial highways. There is a condominum, Carriage 
Lane, almost across the street and the old establishe.d 
business district a very short distance from the property 
and a public school planned for construction within a 
very short distance to the East of the property. The 
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long vacantness of this property demonstrates its lack 
of utility under itiS present zoning, as well as the staff 
analysis of the county planning commission indicated 
that the property is improperly zoned. (Def. Ex. D-25) 
The Supreme Court of Oregon in 1954 in Shaffner vs. 
City of Salem, 268 P.2d 599, had occasion to decide a 
similar case of spot zoning concerning a service sta-
tion. This court cited McMullin on municipal corpor-
ations as cited above. 
Plaintiffs have also attempted to make certain un-
justifiable and improper inferences as to Mr. Roderick, 
President of Bill Roderick, Inc., and Commissioner 
Blomquist on the basis that Mr. Roderick in his testi: 
mony concerning the setting of a bond pending appeal, 
wherein Mr. Roderick said that he knew Commissioner 
Blomquist businesswise. (R. 254) These illusions in 
the brief serve no useful purpose on the appeal of the 
issues in this case, except in an attempt, perhaps, to 
create an atmosphere that the zoning change was ac· 
complished by unsavory and unbusinesslike methods 
and that the obtaining of the zoning was improperly 
done. Mr. Roderick has been an oil distributor for many 
years, a director of the American National Bank, Presi· 
dent of Bill Roderick, Inc., and has held many positions 
in the community. He is highly respected, well-known 
and is personally acquainted with many people in and 
out of political, business and judicial life. It should 
also be pointed out specifically, that the zoning ordinance 
was acted upon by a commission composed of Com· 
missioners, Larson, Jenson, Creer, and aliSo acted upon 
34 
by Commissioner Blomquist and Hanson. It is regret-
able that arguments outside of the record must be made 
in this respect, but it is felt necessary in order to protect 
the good reputations of Bill Roderick and Commissioner 
Blomquist. 
As a closing point in regards to this unpleasant 
argument, respondent-intervenor would like to point 
out that the Linden Methodist Episcopal Church vs. 
Linden, cited on page 54 of plaintiffs' brief, is not in 
point. In that particular case, the applicant for change 
of zoning was actually a member of the zoning com-
mittee, and the change of zoning that said applicant 
requested was passed on by the other councilmen on this 
committee, solely on the basis that he had served faith-
fully to the city for six years and deserved something. 
Further, in that case there was no evidence or testimony 
presented to said council. This is far removed from the 
situation in the present case. 
CONCLUSION 
Intervenor-Respondent considers the sub-titles of 
( d) and ( e) of point V, in plaintiffs' brief, to be in the 
nature of argument and conclusion and included in the 
other issues discussed herein. As indicated within this 
brief, ordinances passed on the legislative body carries 
with it a very strong presumption of validity. All 
doubts as to validity of an ordinance must be resolved 
in favor of validity and in the case of a doubtful case 
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the presumption of validity must prevail. The intervenor 
here has had no part in the legislative proceedings except 
for its application for the zoning change, by submission 
of plats, sketches and its appearance at hearings in 
order to present proper reasons requiring change in the 
zoning ordinance. Intervenor has a valuable property 
right directly involved in this proceeding and its direct 
proprietary interest should not be taken lightly and 
destroyed by minute irregularities that are common in 
all legislative procedures. The burden of showing that 
this ordinance is invalid is very heavy upon plaintiffs 
and their evidence must be so convincing and over· 
whelming as to remove any doubtfulness as to the vali-
dity of the ordinance. This procedure also effects not 
only this zoning ordinance, but perhaps some twelve 
hundred other zoning ordinances passed since the adop· 
tion of the basic statutory laws pertaining to zoning. 
The upsetting of this particular zoning ordinance would 
place in doubt all other zoning ordinances passed by the 
Salt Lake County Commission. 
This writer believes that when the two bishops 
attended the hearing by the planning commission and 
were advised that they had recommended disapproval, 
they in turn advised the interested parties that they 
probably had little or no worry and as a result they did 
not exercise prudent watchfulness thereafter. The issues 
raised by the plaintiffs have been separately answered 
in this brief. It is this writer's belief that some of the 
issues are not properly before the court on appeal. The 
trial judge, was very patient in allowing plaintiffs full 
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opportunity to present its case and had benefit 
of receiving both oral and written arguments. It is 
rather basic on appeal that whenever there is a conflict 
of evidence on a particular issue the respondent is en-
titled to have the issue reviewed in a light most favorable 
to that finding. The decision of the lower court should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Everett E. Dahl 
Leon J. Zanoni 
760 East Center Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Attorneys for Intervenor-
Respondent 
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